Proof of Indian hand in South Waziristan Militancy: army

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan has found concrete evidence of India’s involvement in militancy in South Waziristan and decided to take up the matter with New Delhi.

This was disclosed by Information Minster Qamar Zaman Kaira and military spokesman Major-General Athar Abbas at a press briefing on the progress of operation Rah-i-Nijat here on Monday. It was the first time in recent times that Pakistan had pointed fingers at India from a forum having representation of political and military leadership.

Mr Kaira said although it had been decided to raise the issue with India, Pakistan would not deviate from the peace process.

Gen Abbas said a huge quantity of Indian arms and ammunition, literature, medical equipment and medicines had been recovered from Sherawangi area, near Kaniguram. He said the Foreign Office had been informed and the matter would be taken up with the Indian authorities through diplomatic channels.

Sources in the Foreign Office said a dossier containing proofs of India’s involvement in South Waziristan would soon be handed over to officials in New Delhi.
KANIGURAM TAKEN: Gen Abbas said security forces had secured control of Kaniguram, a redoubt of Uzbek fighters.

He said there were fortified positions and bunkers in the area which were being used by militants in possession of modern weaponry. The entire area had been cleared of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Five truckloads of arms and ammunition were recovered from the area on Monday, he added.

Full Story: DAWN.COM | Pakistan | Proof of Indian hand South Waziristan: army

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Is America Serious in Fighting 'Terrorism'?

Pakistani army is advancing at a fast pace in south waziristan. Resistance by the opponent group is far less than expected. Question arises that why is the resistance that low when it was considered a safe heaven for the armed militants residing there for so many years? Answer to this question becomes evident if we note that american checkposts in afghanistan along the south wazriristan border were removed within a few days after the start of the operation (Reported Here). So we can easily conclude that the militants have moved to afghanistan (obviously they'd have, they were provided the chance by the troops on eastern border of afghanistan).

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Who is responsible for assisting immigrants from tribal areas?

Excerpt from Urooj Zia's story in The News (http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=153180 )


Hundreds and thousands of war affected people from FATA have poured into Karachi in recent months. Many still live with relatives or friends already settled in Karachi. Twelve-year-old Hakim, his six siblings ranging in age from five to 16, his parents and his 78-year-old grandfather, Hikmat, are among them.

Three months ago, the biggest problem in Hakim's life was trying to not get beaten up by his teacher. He was learning the Qura'an by heart at his local mosque, which also doubled as a Madressah in his village near Waziristan. Today, Hakim polishes shoes for a living at a park near his temporary home in Karachi. When business is slow, he begs, as do his siblings and his
grandfather.

"Somewhere around the end of summer, fliers rained down on us from the Pakistan Army aeroplanes. The imam from the mosque said that the fliers were telling us to pack up and leave within six hours, because they would bomb our village," Hakim said. He doesn't know who 'they' are, or why his village was going to be bombed. "We gathered up everything, and left in large trucks. We had heard stories about people who died in other villages because they did not leave when told to do so."

The family came to Hakim's distant uncle in Karachi. This 'uncle' can more appropriately be described as someone who lived in the same village as Hakim's family. Around 40 people from the village came to his house and stayed there for three weeks, before moving in with other Pukhtoon families in the area. Hakim's family of 10, including his parents, however, still live at his 'uncle's' house. The latter already had four children of his own, and the house is actually a mud room in one of the slums around SITE. The small space is divided into a kitchen area and an enclosure for a restroom.

Prior to this move, Hikmat had never set foot outside his village. His son herded goats, which had to be left behind when the family fled. He gained employment a month-and-a-half ago at a local textile mill in Karachi. "My uncle took my father to the Thekedaar (contractor) for this factory, and he hired him," Hakim said.

"My husband hasn't been paid since he joined," Hakim's mother told The News. "He works two shifts at the factory. They said they would pay him last month. Then they said they'll pay him this month. When he protests, they threaten to throw him out, but what would he do if he loses this job? Right now we make ends meet with the money the children bring in."

Hakim's father's story is not unique. While a majority of the people that came to Karachi from FATA have taken to begging – especially old people and children – many of the able-bodied young men have taken up work in the industrial areas of Karachi.

The turnover of labour in these areas is generally extremely high, primarily due to the Thekedaari Nizaam or the contractual system. One person is chosen by the owner of a factory to recruit labour informally for the organisation. These workers are not listed as part of the factory in official labour department reviews, and are open to exploitation – especially immigrants
from FATA.

Almost none of these people had been paid since they joined, and were too scared to protest or quit for fear of losing their jobs and not being able to find another.

Many work multiple shifts, and rest at nearby parks during breaks. "I don't go home because the rooms are already so crowded," said Nihal, a worker at a construction site. "I'd rather just try and get some sleep in this park here, before getting back to work again in an hour."

Meanwhile, the Sindh Labour Department maintains that it has not received complaints regarding the exploitation of these workers. "We can only take action if these workers come up to us and complain," provincial Labour Minister Amir Nawab said. "Once we receive complaints, we constitute an inquiry commission, and try to rectify their grievances. If this does not work, we issue a notice, and then take the matter up as per the law."

"They should unionise and fight for their rights," he said. The children of these families, meanwhile, have taken to either shoe-polishing, selling sugarcane (ganderi) at signals, or begging. Many children who The News spoke to said that "back home" they had been enrolled at local mosques-cum-madressahs where they learnt to read the Qura'an. None of them have set foot inside a school ever since they came to Karachi. Hakim wants to be a Qura'an teacher when he grows up, and is looking forward to getting back to his studies again.

The families, however, have no idea as to when they will be able to go back to their villages, or what to expect when they return. "I don't think anything is left behind there," Hakim's mother said. "We heard of other villages while we were back home. Nothing was left behind there except
rubble. What makes you think our village will be any different?"

Difference between 1-man rule n democracy

US has intensified Fata strikes: WP

Ecerpts only. Source: Dawn

By Anwar Iqbal

WASHINGTON, March 27: The United States has escalated air strikes against Al Qaeda fighters operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas fearing that the new government in Islamabad may object to future strikes, The Washington Post reported on Thursday.
....
Officials interviewed by the Post for the article said Washington wanted to inflict as much damage as it can to Al Qaeda’s network now because President Pervez Musharraf may not be able to offer much help in the months ahead.
....
The Post noted that neither the US nor the Pakistani authorities officially confirmed US missile attacks on Pakistani territory, which would be an infringement of Pakistani sovereignty.
....
Thomas H. Johnson, a research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, told the newspaper that policy makers in Washington were aware that “Musharraf’s days are numbered, and so they recognised they may only have a few months to do this. Musharraf has . . . very few friends in the world -- he probably has more inside the Beltway (Washington) than in his own country.”

The report claimed that after months of prodding, the Bush administration and the Musharraf government this year reached a tacit understanding that gave Washington a freer hand to carry out precision strikes against Al Qaeda and its allies in the border region. The issue, however, is so sensitive that neither side is willing to discuss openly, the report added.

According to the Post, the goal of the new US strategy is partly to try to get information on senior Al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, by forcing them to move in ways that US intelligence analysts can detect.

“It’s not a blitz to close this chapter,” a senior official who spoke on the condition of anonymity told the newspaper. “If we find the leadership, then we’ll go after it. But nothing can be done to put Al Qaeda away in the next nine or 10 months. In the long haul, it’s an issue that extends beyond this administration.”

The report said that the Bush administration’s effort to uproot Al Qaeda also has benefited from shifting loyalties among residents of the border region. Some tribal and religious leaders who embraced foreign Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters as they fled from Afghanistan in 2001 now see them as troublemakers and are providing timely intelligence about their movements and hideouts.

Experts interviewed by Post, however, warned that the new US strategy could backfire if missiles take innocent lives.

“The [tribal] Pashtuns have a saying: ‘Kill one person, make 10 enemies,” said Mr Johnson. “You might take out a bad guy in one of these strikes, but you might also be creating more foot soldiers. This is a war in which the more people you kill, the faster you lose.”

look mush tunay kia haal ker diya mulk ka... may Allah guide u....

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THE SUN ALSO RISES

- reflections, a night before elections

Tomorrow’s parliamentary elections deserve a mention at this forum. Don’t they? Hundreds of miles away from LUMS, back at home, I find myself quite excited about tomorrow. Despite some doubts (so much about these elections remains overcast with doubt), I do sense a moment of reckoning approaching. Slowly, almost silently, the armies of change are marching. You can smell its heady aroma from afar.

This night of hope contrasts so sharply with another that I spent back home, not so long ago. That evening we met Maulana Fazl ur Rehman and Qazi Hussain Ahmad to convince them about the need to support the movement of rule of law, restoration of judiciary and end of Emergency rule. While Qazi sahib was both polite and supportive, Fazl ur Rehman was brusque and dismissive. While one seemed ready to take on the establishment, the other seemed hopelessly sold out to the promise of comprise and acquiescence. One could sense the rift between the two men, already too vast to be gulfed.

As he sat on the sofa, looking somewhere between his feet and speaking a lot of sense, stroking his imposing white beard every now and then, he evoked in me (not a JI-voter) a lot of sympathy. Left in the lurch by his erstwhile companions, he was still standing for his principles, even at the cost of his party’s electoral fortunes. No compromise with dictatorship, nothing less than systemic reform, he vowed. It was normal for me and my fellow students to display such unflinching idealism - we are young, and new to this game. But the same coming from a seasoned leader of one of Pakistan’s major political parties… it took us by surprise. All the same, we could see a somber tinge, or even sadness in his eyes – the somber look of a man about to sacrifice much, a man who knowingly and willing fights a losing battle because he believes in it, a man about to be wiped out by the massive forces he has taken on.

That night, as I put my head to the pillow, I felt terribly depressed by the same thought. I thought then that we too were fighting a losing battle. It looked as though the likes of Fazlur Rehman and Chaudhary Shujaat would outvote everyone and buffet Musharraf’s repressive regime, which we had tried so hard to topple. Nothing will change. No power to the people. No systemic reform. Just status quo. The pessimism that batons and tear gas couldn’t infuse into us was infused into us by one smug look from an establishment politician, and the dejectedness of his erstwhile colleague. That night I thought it was all lost, gone to waste.

Tonight is different altogether. I stand convinced, just like a vast majority of Pakistanis, that tomorrow by the power of our vote, we will bring a lot of change in the system. The system which we shook up by standing before palpable state oppression will be given one final fatal blow by the collective power of our votes. What a magical thing that piece of paper is: thin, small, almost as weightless as air, yet as powerful as a bludgeon; dumb and silent, but sharper than the sharpest of tongues. Tomorrow, inshaAllah, I will see it for the first time in my life, and I will put it to good use.

Tonight also reminds me of the night before November 5, 2007. Back then, I was trying to muster up whatever courage I had, to prepare myself for the next morning when I would go and protest the imposition of martial law, out at the High Court, knowing full well that at that moment, there was no battlefield more dangerous than that, anywhere in the country. Out there, on the first week day after Nov 3, the state’s forces would gather to quell all resistance at its nationwide focal point – the Lahore High Court. That night, we knew that nothing less would get the message across. It was hard a night.

Tonight is so much easier. I am convinced that tomorrow all it would take to get the message across is to cast a vote. There is still a fear of poll-day violence and bombings, but then that fear has almost become a part of our every-day lives. Even that might change in the aftermath of the elections. At least, let’s hope so.

Somehow, I feel another chapter in our history coming to an end – the eight-and-a-half years of dictatorship. To whom should we dedicate this chapter? My first thought, perhaps surprisingly, is Aasim Sajjad, our erstwhile professor. Mention of Asim Sajjad sparks another memory. Almost a year-and-a-half ago, there was news of Musharraf coming to preside over LUMS graduation. Feeling incensed, we held a meeting to sign a petition urging the administration to cancel their invitation. We didn’t want the dictator to be given this gesture of support and respect.

In those days, we had much less hope. So many people lingered under so many illusions and there was so much apathy. Peope would say: Pakistan’s unfit for democracy; Musharraf’s so benevolent and enlightened; Pakistan’s developing so fast, who cares for human rights; we don’t care because our future remains essentially unaffected by whateve happens in politics; Musharraf will always be there and the army’s here to stay in politics, and things of this sort. Tonight, hardly any of those myths survive and there’s much less apathy.

So perhaps we should dedicate this epoch to activists like Aasim Sajjad, and to judges like Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary and lawyers like Ali Ahmed Kurd and Aitzaz Ahsan who stood firm telling Pakistan that no matter how screwed the system was, if you were firm enough and honest enough and brave enough, you could still bring about change. Tonight that change seems so imminent, although it would only be the beginning of a series of changes that need to be brought about. Credit should also go to Imran Khan, who may never become a major player in our politics, but has already managed to transform it deeply. While his party could never get its slogans to the halls of power, those policies and slogans – justice and rights - have been adopted by a major political force, who just might make it into the halls of power. If politics is about ideas, then Imran Khan’s politics, in a strange and indirect way, is flourishing today like never before.

Last but not the least, we might dedicate this era to the ordinary common man who will come out to vote Musharraf and his cronies out. The ordinary voter, the common man, the man on the street also has other reasons to feel avenged. The elections campaign simply destroyed the silence observed by Pakistan’s westernized English-educated elite over the massacre at Lal Masjid and the continuing human rights abuses in the Waziristan war. When the politicians went to the voter on ground, many of them were surprised about how close and alive these issues are to the people’s hearts, particularly my part of the country. In many ways, the ordinary Pakistani was way more touched by the sight of charred bodies and a demolished mosque than the ‘enlightened moderate’ elite that dominates the media. Democracy and its processes like mass campaigning avenged the greater public sentiment, as every politician had to talk about those momentous events, no matter how ‘politically incorrect’ it sounded. The forgotten blood of innocent young girls, the debris of a mosque destroyed, the amputated limbs of Pakhtun civilians in Waziristan, they are all back on the list. Ordinary people have brought them there, showing that while they do care about bread and butter, they also care about more.

I pray for tomorrow and for all the days that follow. May it be that by Allah’s blessing, every coming day lives out its true promise. Ameen.

Invasion of terror

By Babar Sattar

The debate on Pakistan's security policy that lists the country's available options as refusing to function as America's foot soldier in the war on terror versus willingly fighting America's war in our tribal areas is simplistic and misleading. There is no gainsaying that Pakistan needs to fight its own fight against extremism. But that must be distinguished from the US war on terror in Afghanistan, the paramount objective of which is to attack and decapitate Al-Qaeda and Taliban in a manner that they are unable to execute attack on western soil. And if the war strategy results in destabilizing Pakistan or delaying the possibility of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, that could be acceptable damage for the United States. Pakistan's war on extremism, on the contrary, needs to focus on curbing the drift of portions of its own population to extremist ideologies that manifest themselves in the form of indiscriminate violence, undermine the life and liberties of moderate citizens and threaten the writ of the state.

The Bush Administration's war strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas is not working. The Musharraf regime has been a loyal ally to the Bush Administration, but the alliance has had a deleterious impact on Pakistan's internal security situation. The actions of the militants against the state and the citizens of Pakistan are immoral and completely unjustifiable. But in allying itself closely with the US, the Pakistani state and the armed forces have come to be seen as stooges of the west, which have cost them their credibility and moral authority as agents and representatives of the people of Pakistan. Pakistan must realize that its slavish pursuit of the US diktat vis-à-vis the war on terror has become an obstacle in the way of waging an effective war against extremism within Pakistan.

As a matter of foreign policy, Pakistan needs to distance itself from the US war on terror. So long as the Pakistani state, its armed forces and law enforcing agencies are fighting what is largely perceived as an alien war, there will be no popular support for such an effort. But redefining the foreign policy will have to be accompanied with (i) de-legitimization of the role played by jihadi outfits in our security policy and military strategy, (ii) reform of the decision-making mechanisms that produce such policies, (iii) overhaul of the state political structure that supports vital policies that have no popular mandate and denies minority groups a stake in the system, and (iv) addressing the brand of thinking and ideology that justifies violence and suicide attacks against fellow Muslims in the name of Islam.

Ashley Tellis -- senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace -- recently made a statement before a US congressional subcommittee wherein Pakistan's current approach toward extremist groups was elaborated, among other things. In our present context, at least this portion of the statement merits to be quoted at length: "As things stand today, it is possible to identify five distinct extremist groups that ought to be the legitimate target of Pakistani law enforcement and military operations: (i) sectarian groups, such as the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Shia Tehrik-e-Jafria, which are engaged in violence within Pakistan; (ii) anti-Indian terrorist groups that operate with Pakistani military and ISI support, such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Harkat ul-Mujahideen; (iii) the Pakistani 'Taliban' groups, consisting of the extremist outfits in the FATA, led by individuals such as Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan, Maulana Faqir Muhammad and Maulana Qazi Fazlullah of the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad, and Mangal Bagh Afridi of the Lashkar-e-Islami in the Khyber Agency; (iv) the original Taliban movement and especially its Kandahari leadership centred around Mullah Mohammad Omar and believed to be now resident in Quetta; and, finally, (v) Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, meaning the non-South Asian terrorists currently ensconced in the FATA region.

"Since September 2001, President Musharraf has pursued a highly differentiated counterterrorism policy that has involved treating each of these targets differently. He systematically suppressed mainly those domestic terrorist groups like the Sunni Sipah-e- Sahaba and the Shia Tehrik-e-Jafria that had engaged in bloody internal sectarian violence but, more importantly, had subverted critical state objectives. By contrast, he largely ignored the terrorist outfits operating against India in Kashmir and elsewhere: although he has controlled their infiltration into Kashmir in recent years, this restraint has not extended to either abandoning or eliminating them in the manner witnessed, for example, in the case of the more virulent anti-national sectarian entities operating within Pakistan. Fearful of Washington's disfavour, Musharraf has attacked Al-Qaeda resolutely, if not always effectively. Although the Pakistani Taliban did not exist as realistic threats in 2001, Musharraf has also combated them vigorously and as best he can. Musharraf has approached the original Taliban in a manner more akin to the Kashmiri terrorists and has avoided targeting them comprehensively; he has especially overlooked their leadership now resident in and around Quetta."

If this information and analysis is accurate, it identifies a crucial flaw in our security planning: the patrons of our security policy continue to believe that militant groups can be recruited and relied upon to realize the state's strategic goals and further that they can be clustered in neat compartments and accorded disparate treatment. There are at least three fatal flaws in this mode of thinking. One, experience suggests that the jihadi project was misconceived since its inception: non-state actors harnessed in the name of religion might function as effective tools for a while, but they eventually acquire a mind of their own and cannot be decommissioned or reprogrammed when the goals or the strategy of the state change.

Two, in the contemporary world there is zero tolerance for non-state actors. Thus in theory it might make sense to keep the possibility of our erstwhile foreign policy vis-à-vis Kashmir and Afghanistan (with a role of 'mujahideen') alive, nurturing or tolerating any dormant jihadi cells can only have disastrous consequences for the country. Three, the possibility of connections between various militant groups cannot be ruled out even when they are pursuing different goals. For the underlying narrow-minded religious ideology used to induct and brainwash these zealots, that preaches violence and relies on hate mongering, is a shared heritage of all such groups.

While Pakistan has been the frontline state in the war on terror, there is not one popular political entity in the country that backs this war, not even the king's league. We have had a parliament for the past five years, that has had no role in devising Pakistan's policy vis-à-vis the biggest strategic and internal security challenge facing the country. In 2006 the whole world was debating whether reconciliation and peace deals with the local tribes was a good idea, except Pakistan's 'sovereign' parliament. The consequence of a one-man decision-making arrangement is that our armed forces are fighting a war that is neither supported by the nation nor regarded as just. There is no political party that has had to publicly defend this war and thus there is not even an informed debate in the country regarding its pros and cons and the alternatives that Pakistan could pursue.

Winning the war against extremism is not going to be easy. Once we begin to think about our problem of extremism in isolation from the war on terror, there are some tough decisions we must make: we must abandon our jihadi enterprise; we must undertake madressah reform boldly and deliberately; and we must provide security, freedom and public space to the intellectuals and scholars who are capable of challenging bigoted ideologies pandered in the name of religion and confront the ideological roots of violence. But none of this can happen so long as our security policy continues to be made by a handful of individuals who are neither representative of the popular will nor accountable to it. We thus need to start by ensuring that the country pursues a security and foreign policy that is backed by popular mandate. And to that end we need to make our parliament relevant once again.